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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
examination of witnesses by section 69 (3).
They believe that this result is necessary to
avoid circumvention of the direct prohibitions
of sections 136 and 136a by such practices as
first questioning a suspect as a witness to
determine with the aid of lie-detector tests
whether they have the right person to prose-
cute.
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Some of the authorities who favor the use of
lie-detector tests concede that they cannot be
used in the examination of witnesses in view of
the limited application of Section 81c of the
Code which, literally translated, provides:
Persons other than the accused, when they are
witnesses, can be searched without their consent
only when it is necessary for ascertainment of the
truth whether on their body exist positive signs or
effects of a criminal act.
However, others favoring the tests contend
that their use results only in obtaining more
objective impressions of the witness' reaction to
particular questions and that this is a factor
which normally is considered in determining the
truthfulness of the witness. The argument that
a witness should be subjected to a lie-detector
test, even against his will if necessary, is sup-
ported by the fact that the witness, unlike the
accused, is obliged to tell the truth.n
CONCLUSION
Of course, the decision of the Supreme Court
is accepted as a legal reality; however, advo-
cates of the sociological approach which con-
27KOIHLHAAS, supra note 10, at 451; METz.
supra note 19, at 752.
28 LEss, supra note 11, at 323.
siders the rights of the individual in relation to
the well-being of society maintain that the
decision is based upon discredited liberal ideol-
ogy and that it conflicts with the reality of
actual necessity.
Authorities who support the constitutional
state idea hail the Supreme Court as the guard-
ian and preserver of the ideological concepts of
a constitutional state-a guardian who in a
clear and convincing manner prevented the
penetration of the innate sphere of a free
personality.2 On the other hand, the advocates
of the methods of modern criminology reject
the decision because it interferes with the search
for truth; while it preserves the free will and
personality of the accused, the price is a greater
risk of unjust convictions as well as unjust
acquittals. ° These authorities do not oppose
the ideas of human dignity and democracy,
because the issue is not one of their total re-
jection or complete acceptance. There are
necessarv limitations to any right, and some
authorities believe that the public interest in
efficient law enforcement justifies limiting the
freedom of the individual to the extent of allow-
ing the use of lie-detector tests.
3
1
The Supreme Court of West Germany, faced
with the alternative of foregoing the right to
punish some crimes or of opening the door to
possible infringements upon personal freedom,
obviously thought that it elected the lesser evil.
HENRY J. KAGANiEC
Member of the Illinois Bar
2 9 COSTA. Die Verzendung des Luegendefekiars im
Slrafverfahren, KRIMINALISTIK, 8: 177-178, 1954.
30 KNOEOEL. Der Luegendetekior. DrE NEUE
POLIZEI, 8: 150-151, 1954.
- Ibid., pp. 152-153.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
When Witness Falsely Denies He Testified
For State In Return for Leniency, Prosecutor
Must Reveal Truth-One Mantzinos, ap-
prehended while picking up a quantity of
marijuana from a bus terminal locker, identified
the defendant Savvides as the person from
whom he had obtained the narcotic. Mantzinos
pleaded guilty to a charge of illegal possession
of narcotics with intent to sell, pursuant to an
agreement with the prosecutor that, upon
Mantzinos' "continued, truthful co-operation,"
the district attorney would permit him to with-
draw his plea and plead guilty to a lesser
offense. At the defendant's trial on a narcotics
charge, Mantzinos testified for the state as to
the defendant's illegal activities. The court and
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jury were never informed of the promise of
clemency made to Mantzinos as consideration
for his continued co-operation. In addition,
when questioned about this subject, Mantzinos
expressly denied that he anticipated "any
consideration" for his testimony. The prose-
cutor, who had himself made the agreement
with the witness, remained silent.
Shortly after the defendant was found
guilty, the prosecutor assured the judge who
had accepted Mantzinos' guilty plea that the
latter's co-operation was "the ultimate factor"
in obtaining the defendant's conviction.
Whereupon the judge suspended the sentence
previously meted out to Mantzinos. Having
learned of the "deal", the defendant moved to
set aside the verdict entered against him, and
upon denial of his motion, petitioned for an
order in the nature of a writ or error coram
nobis. The New York Court of Appeals re-
versed the denial of defendant's petition and
ordered a new trial, holding that failure to
disclose the witness' lie denied defendant a fair
trial. People v. Samvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554 (1956).
The court considered immaterial the fact
that the falsehood bore upon the credibility of
the witness rather than directly upon the
defendant's guilt. "A lie is a lie," the court said,
"no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any
way relevant to the case, the district attorney
has the responsibility and duty to correct what
he knows to be false and elicit the truth." The
court criticized the practices of offering leniency
to "co-operative" accomplices; such agree-
ments, it was said, encourage false testimony.
The failure to disclose a promise of leniency, the
court said, would seriously hamper the jury in
assessing the worth of the witness' testimony.
In addition, it was said, knowledge that the
defendant had lied under oath might well have
affected the jury's evaluation of his other
testimony. Such conduct denied the defendant
a fair trial, the court concluded, and required
reversal.
Trial Court Must Halt Prosecutor's Pre-
judicial Argument Despite Failure of De-
fendant to Object-The defendant and one
Irwin were indicted for an armed robbery which
Irwin had committed while the defendant
waited in the get-away car. At the trial, de-
fendant denied knowing that his partner
intended to commit a robbery until after
completion of the crime. On the issue of de-
fendant's knowledge, the prosecutor in his
closing argument stated to the jury that there
was sufficient evidence to prove defendant's
knowledge since otherwise the judge would have
taken the case away from the jury. The de-
fendant, the prosecutor further remarked, was
"trying to hook Irwin." The prosecutor char-
acterized the defendant as a "gunman-a
man who had waged war on society since 1928
and always with a gun." He further described
the defendant as the worst offender he had ever
encountered. Other juries, he said, had taken
pity on the defendant "not only on an armed
robbery charge but on a larceny charge as well."
Failure of the jury to convict, the prosecutor
said, would indicate that they lacked "guts."
Despite defendant's failure to object to- the
prosecutor's remarks, the Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that the prosecutor's statements denied
the defendant a fair trial. People v. Moore, 137
N.E.2nd 246 (Ill. 1956).
The general rule, the court said, is that
prejudicial argument by the state will not be
considered on appeal unless objection to the
statement is made during the trial. However, if
the argument is significantly prejudicial, the
court said, the trial judge should, on-his own
motion, stop the argument and instruct the
jury to disregard it. It is permissible for the
state to vigorously denounce the accused and to
urge the jury to enforce the law by returning a
guilty verdict, but the prosecutor may not
interject his personal impressions of the case or
comment on facts not introduced in evidence.
The court found particularly prejudicial the
inference that the judge would have directed a
verdict for the defendant were the evidence
insufficient. Such argument, the court con-
cluded, denied the defendant a fair trial.
Multiple Prosecutions For Mass Murder Do
Not Constitute Double Jeopardy; Evidence Of
Other Deaths During Same Incident Is Ad-
1957]
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missible-During the course of an evening the
defendant had allegedly shot to death his wife
and three children. Thereafter at two consecu-
tive trials, the defendant was convicted and
sentenzed to prison terms for the killings of his
wife and one daughter. Subsequently, the
defendant was indicted for the murder of his
son. At this trial, the defendant made a "motion
to dismiss" on the grounds that the present
prosecution placed him in double jeopardy. The
trial court, denying the motion, rejected the
defendant's argument that the two previous
prosecutions for the murders of his wife and two
daughters were for the same offense as that
charged in the present indictment. During the
course of the trial, the state introduced, over
defendant's objection, evidence of the deaths of
his wife and two daughters. The defendant was
convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. People
v. Ciucci, 137 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. 1956).
Evidence of the deaths of the other members
of defendant's family, it was said, is clearly
within the scope of the res gestae. As to the
claim of double jeopardy, the court observed
that the test is whether the facts charged in the
second indictment would, if true, have justified
a conviction under the earlier indictment.
Applying this test to the present case, the court
concluded that, under the indictment for the
murder of the defendant's wife, a conviction
could not be sustained for the murder of his son.
"It is the identity of the offense," it was said,
"and not of the act, which is referred to in the
constitutional guarantee against double jeop-
ardy; and where two or more persons are un-
lawfully killed, even though by a single act,
there is a corresponding number of distinct
offenses." In addition, the court said, the deaths
involved in the present case were caused by a
series of separate shootings rather than by a
single act.
Numbers Racket Pick-Up Man Need Not
Pay Gamblers' Tax-The defendant was ar-
rested for failure to pay the gamblers' occupa-
tional tax imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code upon an individual "who is engaged in the
business of accepting wagers" and also on one
"who is engaged in receiving wagers for" the
former individual. The defendant was employed
as a "pick-up" man by a numbers racket
"bank." His job consisted of collecting the
yellow slips upon which the bets are noted from
the "writer," the bank's agent with whom
customers place their wagers, and delivering
the yellow slips to the bank which recorded the
bets and paid off the winners. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the trial court, holding that defendant was
exempt from payment of the tax. United States
i. Calamaro, 236 F.2d 182 (3rd Cir. 1956).
The prosecution conceded that a pick-up
man is not engaged in the business of "accept-
ing wagers" but insisted that all who participate
in the numbers racket, other than bettors, are
engaged "in receiving wagers." Rejecting this
notion, the majority based its holding on a
literal application of the language of the statute.
Before the pick-up man enters the picture, the
court pointed out, the writer has physically
received the wager from the bettor. At the same
time, it was said, the wager, in legal contempla-
tion, came into possession of the bank, since the
writer is the bank's agent. A pick-up man, the
court observed, is merely a messenger who
transports the record of the gambling trans-
action, not the wager itself, from the writer to
the bank.
The dissent maintained that receipt by the
pick-up man of the ticket on \vhich the bet is
recorded amounts to "receiving a wager." The
majority's position, it was argued, will offer
everyone connected with the numbers game the
opportunity to avoid payment of the tax by
asserting that they are merely pick-up men.
The dissent pointed out that the majority's
view is in disagreement with Daley v. United
States, 231 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1956) and Sagonias
v. United States, 223 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1955)
which held numbers racket pick-up men subject
to the gambling tax.
Illinois Provides Free Transcripts Of Record
For Indigent Defendants-In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 (1956), the United States Supreme
Court had reversed a judgment of the Illinois
Supreme Court denying free transcripts to
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indigent defendants in non-capital cases. The
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the states to provide equal opportunity
for full appellate review to all defendants
regardless of their ability to pay for the costs of
such review.
The case was remanded to the Illinois
Supreme Court for further action in accord
with the ruling of the United States Supreme
Court. The first question considered on remand
by the Illinois court was whether to provide
review to indigents by provision for free tran-
scripts or to make such review available through
other means such as bystander's bill of excep-
tions. The court resolved this issue through the
promulgation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
65-I which provides that, upon a showing of
indigence; persons sentenced after April 23,
1956, the date of the United States Supreme
Court decision in the Griffin case, may obtain
transcripts at the expense of the state. "Twenty-
nine states," the court said, "provide free
transcripts as of right to indigents convicted in
non-capital crimes. That this course is highly
desirable has long been apparent. The decision
of the Supreme Court now makes it impera-
tive."
A question not presented by the Griffin case
but dealt with by the court was that of the ap-
plication of the Griffin ruling to defendants
sentenced prior to that decision who had been
unable to obtain appellate review of their
convictions because of indigence. The United
States Supreme Court did not expressly set out
the scope of its decision. The Illinois court,
however, amended rule 65-1 to provide free
transcripts to indigents sentenced prior to the
Griffin decision. The failure of a prisoner to have
requested a free transcript within the period
provided by Illinois law, the court indicated,
will not constitute a waiver of his right. "Waiver
assumes knowledge," it was said, "and we are
unwilling to hold, under the circumstances of
this case, that the constitutional rights of
prisoners have been waived." In addition, the
court said, prisoners who had appealed under
the Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act but
had failed to raise the issue of denial of a free
transcript would not be barred by res judicata
from now presenting that question in a new
proceeding.
Public May Be Excluded From Courtroom
During Defendant's Testimony When Witness
Is Emotionally Disturbed-At her trial on a
charge of murder, the defendant made a
motion, acquiesed in by the prosecution, that
the public be excluded from the courtroom
during the entire proceedings. The defendant
proposed to testify on her own behalf, she said,
concerning abnormal sexual practices enforced
upon her by the murder victim. Her emotional
disturbance at the prospect of so testifying in
public would, she claimed, prevent her from
co-operating with her counsel and render her
unable to testify freely. The trial court granted
the motion on the grounds that the presence of
the public and the press would deprive the
defendant of a fair trial and that publicizing the
witness' testimony would not be in the public
interest. Thereupon, local newspapers peti-
tioned an appellate court for a writ commanding
the trial court to admit the public to the court-
room. The appellate court, deciding the ques-
tion even though the trial had since been
completed, held that the trial court erred in
excluding the public and press during the entire
trial. However, the court said, it would be
within the trial court's discretion to exclude the
public during the defendant's testimony if such
action were necessary in order to insure a fair
trial. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 300 P.2d 163
(Cal. Dist. Ct. of Appeal 1956).
The court rejected the defendant's argument
that public trial is a right granted for the
protection of the defendant and may be
waived by her. Statutory and constitutional
provisions for public trial, it was said, are
declaratory of the common law which accorded
the public the privilege of attending criminal
trials apart from the right of an "open court-
room" possessed by the defendant. Thus, the
court said, a waiver of the defendant's right is
not sufficient to exclude the public. However,
the court concluded, where a witness, because
of emotional disturbance, would be unable to
testify freely in the presence of spectators, the
trial court, in order to insure the defendant a fair
1957]
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trial, may exclude the public during the wit-
ness' testimony.
Denial Of A Hearing To Determine Sanity
Of Defendant At Time Of Trial Violates Due
Process Of Law-Defendant was indicted and
brought to trial on a charge of burglary. No
motion had been made prior to the trial for a
sanity hearing. During the trial, defendant's
counsel stated to the court that his obser-
vation of the defendant convinced him that
he was insane and unable to cooperate with
his counsel. At that time the attorney moved
for an adjournment to permit a psychiatric
examination of the defendant. The motion
was denied by the court who said that defend-
ant would receive such an examination at a
later time. Upon completion of the evidence
the jury returned a guilty verdict, at which time
defendant's counsel moved for a psychiatric
examination before sentence. The court denied
the motion, stating that he did not think that
the defendant was insane and that a psychiatric
examination was unnecessary. Therefore, de-
fendant obtained a hearing before the trial
court under the Illinois Post Conviction Hear-
ing Act at which it was alleged that failure to
afford the defendant a sanity hearing at the
time of his trial to determine whether he was
insane at the time of trial and at the time of
commission of the crimes violated due process
of law. At this hearing, defendant's attorney
testified that, prior to the trial, the defendant
was able to discuss the case with his counsel
coherently, but when the defendant testified at
the trial he told a story different from that
which he previously had told his attorney, and,
thereafter, was unable to give rational answers
to his attorney's queries. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the trial court held that, because
the request for a sanity hearing was not made
until after the trial had begun, the request came
too late. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
and ordered a new trial. Brout v. People, 134
N.E.2d 760 (Ill. 1956).
As a general rule, the court said, whether the
issue of insanity should be determined before
the trial is within the discretion of the trial
court. However, it was said, this discretion is
not absolute and where the defendant's at-
torney stated to the court in good faith that he
thought the defendant insane, the judge should
have investigated the defendant's mental con-
dition. The investigation by the judge should
be more than a perfunctory inquiry, the court
observed; the parties should have the opportu-
nity to present evidence and argument. The
court considered it immaterial that the de-
fendant's motion for a sanity examination did
not technically comply with the formal require-
ments of the statute providing for such a
hearing. A construction of the statute which
would deny a hearing unless technical rules of
procedure are followed, it was said, would
deprive the defendant of due process of law.
However, the court indicated that its remarks
were directed to the issue of insanity at the time
of trial. The defense of insanity at the time of
the crime must be formally raised at the time of
trial and submitted to the jury or it is waived.
Guilty Plea Cannot be Entered by Stipula-
tion of Defendant's Counsel-The defendant, a
conscientious objector, pleaded not guilty to a
charge of willfully evading an order of his draft
board. During the trial before a federal district
judge, without a jury, the defendant's at-
torney stipulated in open court that the de-
fendant, with knowledge of the draft board's
order, had intentionally disobeyed it. "We have
no defense," the attorney said, "the Govern-
ment had established a prima facie case and we
are unable to upset it." The trial court there-
after found the defendant guilty and later
stated that where a defendant stipulates to the
pertinent facts and admits that the prosecution
has established a prima facie case, "it is equiva-
lent for all facts and purposes to a guilty plea."
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction,
holding that a conviction cannot be based on
stipulations by the defendant's attorney. Julian
v. United States, 236 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1956).
The stipulation by the attorney that de-
fendant had intentionally committed the of-
fense, the court said, is in effect the entry by
stipulation of a plea of guilty. At common law,
it was said, a defendant had to personally plead;
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a plea by counsel was not acceptable unless
approved in person by the defendant. In the
present case, there is no evidence, the court
said, that the defendant had approved his at-
torney's stipulations. In addition, rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a judge shall not accept a guilty plea with-
out inquiring whether it is made voluntarily
and with understanding by the defendant.
Since the judge in the present case considered
the stipulations to be in effect a guilty plea,
the court concluded he should have asked the
defendant whether he understood and acqui-
esced in them.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police
Science Legal Abstracts and Notes," infra
pp. 624-628)
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